Van Winder v. Brenda Kathy Winder : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Van Winder v. Brenda Kathy Winder : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rosalie Reilly; Attorney for Appellant.
William Schultz; Attorney for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Winder v. Winder, No. 981764 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1896
*H COURT OF APP6AL© 
BRIEF 
4ENT 
UJr * 
ET NO. W/1W -&ft-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VAN WINDER, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRENDAKATHY WINDER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
* 
* 
Case No. 981764-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
ROSALIE REILLY (SBN 6637) 
148 South Main, #1 
Post Office Box 404 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (435) 587-3266 
Attorney for Appellant 
WILLIAM SCHULTZ (SBN 3626) 
Post Office Box 937 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435) 250-5914 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
SEP 11 « « 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Authorities ii 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
III. ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I. THE NECESSITY OF AN APPRAISAL 
JUSTIFIED A CONTINUANCE. 2 
POINT II. NO CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST 
WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A DEPARTURE FROM 
THE GENERAL RULE REGARDING MARITAL 
PROPERTY 4 
V. CONCLUSION 7 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 754 P.2d 84 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 4 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 1 
ii. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IVAN WINDER, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * Case No. 981764-CA 
* 
vs. * Priority No. 15 
* 
BRENDA KATHY WINDER, 
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 24, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant 
replies to Appellee's brief as follows. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant (hereinafter "Brenda") takes issue with Appellee's (hereinafter 
"Ivan") statement of facts as follows: 
Ivan insinuates that the Zion loan was used solely for improvements on the 
marital residence (Appellee's Brief at p. 5). Although Brenda concedes that the 
loan was for twenty five-thousand dollars, not all of the monies were used for the 
improvements (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 24, 55). By his own testimony, Ivan 
also used that money for a 'cushion' and on furniture that he claimed that he built 
to sell (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 39, 55). 
Ivan's focus on Brenda using marital funds on her trailer is misleading. 
Brenda's trailer was always her separate property and she expended her own 
earnings on her trailer after she and Ivan separated (R. 73 at p. 82-85). 
Contrary to the assertion that "Brenda concedes that 'it's clear from the 
Complaint that respondent has no interest whatsoever in the residence they 
shared'," there was never a concession of this sort (Appellee's Brief at p. 8). 
Ivan has taken out of context of an otherwise poorly worded statement by the 
undersigned.1 From the beginning, when the answer was filed, and through the 
trial, Brenda claimed an interest in the marital residence (R. 5 at H 7). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE NECESSITY OF AN APPRAISAL JUSTIFIED 
A CONTINUANCE. 
This Court should reject Ivan's position that Brenda failed to act with due 
diligence (Appellee's Brief at p.8). The trial court never stated or even suggested 
that the denial of the continuance was due to Brenda's failure to be diligent. 
Rather, the trial court considered the parties' proffer and simply concluded that it 
could reach a decision about the division without an appraisal, rendering a 
continuance unnecessary: 
The following is the sentence in context: 
I know that it is going to be the petitioner's position, and 
it's clear from the Complaint that respondent has no 
interest whatsoever in the residence that they shared. I 
believe it is a martial residence that she is entitled— 
under the law is entitled to have an equity [interest] in 
that home. 
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You've both been in these cases where someone is 
claiming an interest in a marital residence. I think you 
both have an idea where I am going to come out on that. 
Just because something is used as a place for two 
people who are married to live doesn't make it a marital 
property. But just because somebody pays something 
out of his own pay check, doesn't mean it isn't marital 
property. Everything they earn during the term of their 
marriage is "marital." So she may have a claim for the 
extent for which the mortgage was reduced during the 
term of the marriage. That would probably be the extent 
of it. That may be offset by his claim if there is some 
equity in the other direction with respect to her 
residence. I haven't heard that. So I'm prepared to go 
ahead and try this case. 
(R. 73 at p. 11-12). 
The problem with not having an appraisal was apparent when the value of 
the home became disputed. At trial, Ivan claimed that the value was between 
sixty and seventy thousand dollars (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 52). In his brief, 
Ivan claims that the value is "impossible" to determine the value since "the value 
of something is its fair market value, not what you pay your family for it." 
(Appellee's Brief at p. 10). 
Ivan's criticism of Brenda's failure to introduce evidence of the value of the 
home during the marriage should be rejected (AppeNee's Brief at p. 10). This is 
precisely what an appraisal would have addressed.2 
Although Brenda did present some evidence by way of a market analysis, 
an appraisal would have been much more desirable for the reasons stated to the 
trial court and for the reasons set forth in Ivan's brief (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 
7; Appellee's Brief at 10-11). 
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POINT II: NO CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A 
DEPARTURE FROM THE GENERAL RULE REGARDING 
MARITAL PROPERTY. 
There were no circumstances presented by Ivan justifying departure from 
the general rule that each party is presumed to be entitled to 50% of the marital 
property See generally, Maxwell v Maxwell, ISA P 2d 84 (Utah Ct App 1988) 
Brenda is asking is that this Court look to what had been realized as a 
result of their joint efforts and allow both to share equally in that result That 
Brenda kept her trailer separate from the marital property adds nothing to the 
analysis (Appellee's Brief at p 3) That the parties were advanced in age adds 
nothing to the analysis (Appellee's Brief at p 3) That the parties were married 
for a short time adds nothing to this analysis (Appellee's Brief at p 3) That the 
parties had an unhappy marriage adds nothing to the analysis (Appellee's Brief at 
P 3) 
Ivan disregards the general rule and simply starts arguing about Brenda's 
trailer (Appellee's brief at p 5) Ivan takes the position that since Brenda allowed 
her son to live in her trailer, she deprived him of a marital asset (Appellee's brief 
at p 5) The only evidence presented to support this was Ivan's testimony that 
there had been a discussion about fixing up the trailer and renting it "when we 
decided to get married we were going to fix it up and to rent But that never 
did come about" (R 73, trial transcript at p 63) 
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There is no basis for Ivan to claim any interest in Brenda's trailer. The 
trailer was her premarital property which Brenda chose to keep separate from the 
marriage. All of the substantial changes made on the trailer were done post 
separation so that Brenda would have a place to live (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 
83-85). There is absolutely no evidence that the trailer lost its identity as 
separate property. 
The circumstances about the trailer stand in sharp contrast to the marital 
residence. The marital residence is where both Ivan and Brenda devoted their 
time and energy: In Ivan's own words, "it was a real dump, it wasn't liveable" 
(R. 73, trial transcript at p. 60). Brenda's significant contributions to that home 
should not be ignored. 
The trial court's conclusion that Ivan's interest in Brenda's pension or 
retirement plan and Brenda's interest in the marital home was a "wash" is not 
supported by the evidence (R. 73, trial transcript at p. 126-127). This is 
especially true since Ivan waived, in the complaint, an interest in each other's 
pension and/or retirement plans (R. 2). Yet, the only waiver that was addressed 
by the trial court was Ivan's waiver. 
Not only did Ivan waive his interest in Brenda's pension plan in the 
Complaint, but the trial court only speculated as to the increase in value either the 
pension and/or the marital residence (R. 2 at fl6). Consider the following: 
[Brenda] has an arguable claim there because she 
5 
moved in there, she helped to make it a nice place. She 
helped with the landscaping, she may have helped him 
with the work that he was doing to actually improve the 
property, and she was there with him as a marriage 
entity while the mortgage on the property was being 
reduced. I would say parenthetically that I've just done 
some rough calculations and it appears to me that the 
mortgage was probably reduced by around $6,000, 
$7,000, maybe $8,000 during the term of the marriage, 
from what I know about interest rates and the terms of 
this mortgage, and she may have added with her 
landscaping efforts something like $2,000 or $3,000 to 
the value. And she may have—it's almost impossible to 
quantify what it meant that he was able to devote his 
time to this because she was doing other things. He 
was able to devote his time to improving the property 
because she was doing other things . . . She may be 
entitled to something if (the parties' income) was the 
only thing that I was looking and it might be something 
in the order of under $5,000. But at the same time, she 
was accruing pension benefits at her work that he is 
making no claim on. If those are seven percent of her 
earnings, and if she was making $1,200 a month . . . 
that's going to be about $1,000 a year. I think it may not 
entirely offset it, but we're not talking about a big 
difference here. 
(R. 73, trial transcript at p. 126-127). 
The trial court's speculation as to the decrease in the mortgage, the 
increase in the value of Ivan's home and the increase in the value of only 
Brenda's pension plan is not sufficient justification to deny Brenda the right to 
share in the benefit to Ivan's home. That Brenda had a pension plan for which 
Ivan made no claim is not sufficient justification to deny Brenda the right to share 
in the benefit to Ivan's home. In sum, there are no circumstances presented by 
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the Court which would justify departing from the general rule that each party is 
entitled to one-half of the marital assets. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's distribution of the property and remand for an 
equitable distribution. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 1! 
R0SALIE RE1LLY 
^Attorney for Appellant 
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